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In 1829 and 1830 the government of the Cape Colony allowed 
several hundred families of Xhoi descent to settle on a piece of land 
near the headwaters of the Kat River. This step had a double purpose: 
to establish a military barrier against the Xhosa on the other side of 
the eastern border; and to give a practical demonstration of the 
legal equality between Khoi and Xhosa implicit in the recently enacted 
Ordinance 50. During the frontier wars of 1835 and 1846 the Kat River 
Settlers mostly took the government side against the Xhosa, and 
suffered heavy material losses in consequence. Despite this evidence 
of their attachment to the colony, they were regarded with suspicion 
and dislike by the eastern province colonists. After 1846 tension 
between the two sides increased sharply. Rumours were revived of an 
impending combination between Xhoi and Xhosa to destroy the colonists. 
In 1851 another frontier war began, and some 250 Khoi from the Kat 
River Settlement joined the Xhosa. When the war ended the colonial 
government confiscated the land of these rebels and granted it to 
colonists, thus destroying the exclusively aboriginal character of the 
Settlement. Apologists for the Khoi tried to demonstrate that their 
disaffection was prompted by purely local considerations, and made 
great play of the fact that the Settlement had been administered for 
some time prior to the rebellion by government officials known to have 
strong antipathies to the independence the Khoi enjoyed because of 
their individual possession of land. Such local factors may have 
contributed to the anger and disgust of the settlers, but they leave 
much unexplained - not least the fact that some one thousand Khoi 
from elsewhere on the frontier (including the mission stations of 
Shiloh and ~heopolis) also fought with the Xhosa. This paper will 
attempt to describe certain economic developments which coincided 
with the Settlementfs brief life as an exclusively aboriginal entity 
and which influenced the rebellion which finally took place. 
The Kat River Settlement was not destroyed simply because of 
social prejudice and race feeling. The increasingly vociferous attacks 
on it were principally inspired by economic pressures resulting from 
expansion in the British and Cape woollen industries, The statistics 
for the time are unreliable, but certain broad conclusions may safely 
be drawn from them. The first is that although woollen manufactures 
declined in relative importance as a contributor to British national 
income after 1840, this was caused by the increase of other industrial 
outputs and not by any decline in the woollen industry itself. The 
amount of wool yielded by the domestic clip in Britain declined in real 
terms. Simultaneously, the woollen manufacturing industry entered a 
forty year period of expansion during which its raw wool consumption 
more than doubled. Imports made up the shortfall between the industry's 
needs and the domestic clip. London became the central market for 
imported wool. New machinery introduced into British factories made 
this expansion possible. The rate of mechanization (and probably of 
new investment) quickened from 1839 to 1850 and reached its peak in the 
1850s and 1860s. Impressed by these rapid advances, men employed in 
the industry tended to make exaggerated forecasts of its capacity to 
maintain a similar rate of growth in the future. (1) 
The Australian colonies profited most from the growing 
British demmd for imported wool. Continental suppliers - until 1843 
the major exporters to Britain - rapidly lost their importance. Cape 
wool, without approaching the volume exported from Australia, 
nevertheless gained a significant foothold in the British market. The 
main expense faced by colonial exporters was ocean freight, and in this 
respect the Cape, being nearer to London, had an advantage over 
Australia. Figures for wool exports, computed from accounts kept by 
customs officials and port authorities, are untrustworthy. But they 
give some idea of the vigorous progress of Cape wool farming once it 
had become established: 
Annual Wool Exports - Cape Coloq 
(~ounded to the nearest 000) 
Of these mounts, the quantity exported to countries other than Britain 
appears to have been negligible. Domestic consumption was also low. 
Although in Britain wool was eclipsed by other industries, at 
the Cape it rapidly ousted wine as the staple produce and export. Its 
value to the colony varied according to quality and the ruling price on 
the London market, where public sales were held every quarter. 
Fluctuations in price did not depend so much on supply, which 
continually increased, as on "commercial vicissitudes and political 
circumstances". (2) Between 1815 and 1870 the lowest point touched was 
in 1848, when continental revolutions followed the great commercial 
crisis of 1847. Generally, however, prices mounted regularly every year 
until 1860. Cape wools were almost unknown before 1840, when London 
brokers first started to look forward to "a, large and valuable export 
from that thriving colony . . . l ' .  (3) Thereafter wool brought more 
wealth into the Colony every year. Again, the figures are suspect, but 
it appears that in 1840 the farmers realized well under ~100,000; in 
1845 the swn rose to £175,000; and in 1851 reached %286,000. 
The discovery of a breed of woolled sheep suited to South 
African conditions, coinciding with the prolonged and spectacular 
expansion of the British wool market, created a good climate for capital 
investment. But the Cape faced serious difficulties in this respect. 
British wool dealers were unwilling or unable to extend their 
operations to the colonies until much later in the century, and the 
leading banking and issue houses of the London capital market preferred 
to look elsewhere for business. A change to wool farming was too 
expensive for many individual Cape farmers. Communications were poor 
and those living in remote areas could not afford to transport their 
produce to the nearest port or market. The money which defeated these 
problems seems to have come mainly from two sources: private 
investors from overseas and the merchant houses of Cape Town. 
A new class of wealthy imigrant started to arrive from 
Britain and other parts of the empire. In 1841 a number of settlers in 
the eastern districts negotiated bills in favour of the colony to the 
value of £20,000. Two years later "several Indian capitalists and 
otherstt bought farms in the western division. An Englishman named 
Nicholson spent £2,100 on stock in a single year at Uitenhage. On 
another occasion a colonel named OIReilly sold out of the British army 
for £4,000, all of which he invested in a farm on the eastern frontier. 
Not all participation was as direct as this, however. In some 
instances British capitalists played the role of sleeping partners in 
ventures with colonial farmers. The arrangement between the Earl of 
Sheffield and a Cape sheep breeder during the 1820s and 1830s seems to 
provide m early example of one such relationship. These examples show 
the important part played by individual contributions in the financing 
of the Cape woollen industry. 
Elsewhere the merchants of Cape Town provided vital services 
for the wool farmers. The most important were Maximillian Thalwitzer 
and the two Mosenthal brothers, German Jews who had emigrated to the 
Cape earlier in the century. Thalwitzer indirectly encouraged wool 
production in the 1830s by acting as an itinerant wool buyer in the sheep 
country of the western Cape. After 1840 he became more directly 
involved, hiring the Cape packet to import merino sheep and bringing in 
men from Holstein who could teach the farmers how to she= and tend them. 
As consul for the Haseatic cities of Hamburg, Lubeck and Bremen, he 
encouraged German investment. Through him the Hamburg firm of Lippert & 
CO built up a flourishing connection as wool importers from the Cape. 
Mosenthal Bros opened a branch at Port Elizabeth in 1842. To overcome 
the problems caused by poor communications, they established a chain of 
stores and agencies throughout the eastern districts to which farmers 
could bring their produce and receive pa;yment without the expense a d  
inconvenience of a long journey. When sufficient quantities were 
accumulated they could be cheaply transported to the nearest port or 
market. The Mosenthals "created an orgavlized system of commerce by 
means of which the produce of the individual farmer, in itself perhaps 
economically insignificant, could profitably reach the national and 
world consumer market in the mass'!. (4) 
They did not confine themselves to acting as middlemen. They 
also became financiers and bankers to the first generation of eastern 
Cape wool farmers. When times were hard they provided the credit which 
kept their clients in business. Their notes began to circulate, drawn 
on their Cape Town offices; when that was discontinued they became 
representatives on the boards of baulks. "The role they filled in 
quickening the economic pulse of the area they served can hardly be 
overestimated." (5) Other establishments in Cape Town were quick to 
see the possibilities offered by the sheep walks of the eastern 
districts. One of the most important reasons for the failure of the 
separation movement in this area (which has been overlooked in the 
recent Oxford History of South Africa, I) was the extent to which the 
east was controlled bgr Cape Town money. As a prominent western 
politiciaa and businessman observed in 1851, "a large proportion of the 
money in Cape Town is derived from mortgages on frontier farms and 
frontier estates; a large portion of the trade of Table Bay is 
connected with the frontier; and a great many people in Cape Town have 
a.n interest in estates in the eastern provincefr. (6) 
The Hottentots (7) of the Kat River Settlement were unable to 
take part in this new phase of economic development. They soon learned 
that they could not avail themselves of the vitally important credit 
which sustained the farmers of European origin. On 10 November 1831 an 
incident occurred which mace their position graphically clear. The 
occasion was a public sale of farming stock conducted by an English 
auctioneer named Joseph from the village of Somerset, at which many 
people from the Settlement were present. Before starting the sale 
Joseph arwnounced that all purchases made by the Hottentots would have to 
be paid for in cash before delivery. He allowed the European farmers to 
buy at a credit of several months. The Settlement people were 
discriminated against because Itthey possessed but little property . . . "(8) 
The announcement gave immediate and bitter offence. One party of 
Hottentots adopted so menacing an attitude that rumours began to 
circulate of a Hottentot rebellion and a spasm of panic shook the 
frontier. Since land was an important form of security and a principal 
element in the Victorian conception of "property1?, it may be seen that 
the colonial governmentls refusal to grant lands in freehold tenure to 
Hottentots severely limited their financial prospects. 
Opinion in the eastern Cape, while unanimous that to "turn 
land to advantage a supply of labour must be foundf1, was divided about 
the best means of procuring it. The mass of Boers and one portion of 
the British settlers looked to the Hottentots and aborigines as the 
source. The Boers were seldom inclined to make active attempts to 
influence the colonial government; but the British lost no opportunity 
to do so. They clamoured against any measure calculated to make the 
aborigines independent of the labour market. The mission stations, 
which gave some colonial Hottentots an opportunity to live self- 
sufficient lives without the need to work for others, were particularly 
unpopular. The missionaries were accused of acting in a spirit of 
"abominable false Philanthropyfl and so keeping labour away from the 
market. (9) The Hottentots themselves were fully aware of these 
sentiments. One of them told a select committee of the House of 
Commons in 1836 that "since the Hottentots went to the Kat River and 
got ground, it appears that the English settlers are angry about it, 
and say everything that is bad against us". (10) 
There was one aspect of Hottentot reluctance to work which no 
farmer at the time cared to comment upon: the low level of wages. The 
information available on this subject is patchy and sometimes 
unreliable, but some tentative conclusions may be drawn from it. The 
first is that European labourers in the colony received twice the 
salary for the same work as that performed by the Coloureds. The second 
is that agricultural work paid less than any other kind. Thirdly, the 
rate of agricultural pay, as in Britain, remained static or actually 
declined between 1830 and 1850. In the district of Albany (for which 
the figures are comprehensive) the wage for manual labourers on sheep 
farms was 1/6d per day, or, assuming a six day week, about g1 .15.0. to 
£2.0.0. per month. This wage did not alter between 1842 and 1858. In 
the surrounding districts it was lower. The general practice was to 
provide food and lodging in addition to the money, but "lodging" often 
consisted merely of permission granted to the labourer to build on his 
employer1s land. There were, of course, exceptions. A few farmers gave 
their shepherds 5% of the annual profit on the flocks, but this practice 
was not widespread. Nevertheless, at the close of 1839 it was 
estimated at the Cape that from 35,000 to 40,000 Hottentots and 
aborigines were working within the Colony, a considerable number on 
farms . 
Sheep farming advanced rapidly in the eastern Cape after 1840. 
In the season from November 1841 to February 1842 sixty-four additional 
flocks came into clip and there were several large importations of fresh 
stock direct from Europe, with married immigrants and servants to carry 
on sheep farming. Albany pastured some 200,000 woolled sheep in 1842, 
so recently introduced that only one half were ready for clipping. By 
1846 the number rose to 500,000. As the quality of wool improved it 
commanded better prices on the London market. Among the settlers of 
British origin this growth led to a feeling of euphoria. The future 
seemed to lie with "the golden fleece - the true and permanent riches 
of South Africa". (11) In 1841 a speaker told the annual meeting of the 
Cape Agricultural Society that wool production might be increased "to 
an almost unlimited extent". (12) 
To flourish in the Cape, imported sheep needed good grazing 
and an equitable climate. Conditions were not ideal, and sheep such as 
Leicesters never managed to establish themselves. But Saxons and 
merinos quickly adapted to those areas called the "highveld" in the 
Orange River territory and eastern Cape, where the rainfall varied from 
sixteen to twenty-five inches a year. The north-eastern portions of the 
semi-desert Karroo, with a rainfall of under fifteen inches, were also 
satisfactory. The uncertainty of rainfall and the prolonged dry season, 
however, made it essential for every sheep run to have some permanent 
supply of water in the form of a spring, river frontage, or dam. 
Grazing could be grass or shrubs, depending on the nature of the country. 
It had to be "sweetf1. In the "sour" areas (known to the Boers as 
zuurveld) the vegetation was unsuitable. South African sheep territory 
did not eqerience extremes of temperature, in either sumner or winter, 
although the range between day and night was sometimes considerable. 
Provided they had water, the sheep could survive the occasional hot 
spell; the snow which frequently accompanied the last weeks of the 
cold season rarely lasted long enough to destroy them. 
The best land for sheep farming in the 1840s and 1850s was 
described at length in contemporary accounts of the eastern Cape. As 
the zuurveld gave way to the grasslands of upper Albany the traveller 
entered "the land of English sheep farming par excellence". (13) 
Moving further inland, he discovered large stretches of ~roductive 
country. In the Fort Beaufort district sheep farming wag the principal 
occupation, "much of the country being grassy and suited to the fine 
woolled sheep which are pastured on itn. (14) The Bruintjes Hoogte 
area of Somerset, and the lands along the Baviaans and Mankazana 
rivers as far as the Winterberg, had "some of the largest and most 
valuable flocks of wool-bearing sheep that are to be found in the 
colony". (15) The district of Cradock was celebrated for the fatness 
of its stock and the opulence of its proprietors. (16) Victoria East 
contained large tracts of fine and productive country with pasture 
particularly healthy for sheep and cattle. This was especially true of 
the part towards Cradock and the Bontebok Flats, where there was rich 
grass, permanent water, and clear, open land. (17) 
A glance at the map immediately explains the significance 
of this analysis: the Kat River Settlement, with its numerous streams 
and fertile soil, lay right at the heart of the finest sheep territory 
in the eastern division. What the map does not reveal, however, is the 
composition of the settler population in those districts which impinged 
upon the Settlement. Until 1834 this had been overwhelmingly Boer, 
but the Great Trek had resulted in a wholesale abandonment of the area. 
The British settlers in A l b w ,  among whose chief grievances in the 
preceding fifteen years had been the small size of the farms allotted 
to them on their arrival, immediately took advantage of the exodus to 
establish themselves in the place of the Boers. Between 1834 and 1854 
there was a marked change in the demography of the eastern districts. 
The British settlers left Albavly for precisely those areas where sheep 
farming was most profitable and congregated along the-boundaries of the 
Kat River Settlement. They were joined by many emigrants from Britain 
who further strengthened the British character of these formerly Boer 
centres. After the annexation of Victoria East to the Colony in 1847 
they were also able to move into the sheep country of the Xhosa. The 
extent of this movement into Victoria was remarkable. So many farmers 
from Lower Albavly had "received grants of land between the Fish River 
and the Keiskamma", the Cape Parliament heard in 1855, that the 
population was "much scarcer" than before the war of 1846. (18) Away 
from the best sheep land, however, the Boer population continued in a 
majority. 
By the mid 1840s practically all the worthwhile farming land 
in the Cape had been granted by the government to private individuals. 
In 1846 the total area of the colony was estimated at about one hundred 
and ten thousand square miles, or seventy million acres. Of this, 
approximately forty-three million acres (or three-fifths) had been 
granted. Most of the remaining two-fifths comprised "mountain ranges 
and arid plains, almost entirely unfit for agricultural or pastoral 
purposes". The balance was loan tenure farms, missionary institutions, 
town commons, outspan places, lands formerly surveyed but to which 
title deeds still had not been issued, and, finally, the Kat River 
Settlement. (19) Nobody showed interest in the land unfit for either 
agriculture or ranching. One observer pointed out in 1842 that 
although there was much vacant land in Graaf Reinet, Uitenhage and 
Somerset, it was destitute of water. Another added that m a ~ l y  of the 
areas designated as llunoccupied" formed pockets in the midst of 
occupied farms and could be of use only if attached to them. 
The lack of suitable land in the Cape did not deter some 
spokesmen for the British settlers from trying to attract emigrants by 
promises of available farms. J. C. Chase described the colony as 
"under-peopledf1, and spoke of five million "unappropriated acres 
saleable by the government". Outside the colonial boundaries there was 
an inexhaustible supply, he wrote, adding, in "the productive, but 
inadequately peopldcountry of the Kaffirs, in extent upward of twenty 
million acres, whose inhabitants would gladly admit European  settler^'^, 
there were "immense tracts of land fitted for the reception of 
emigrantsfr. (20) One settler who believed this account became 
disillusioned after arriving at the Cape, and criticized Chase for his 
inaccurate statements. This criticism was quite justified: not only 
was virtually nothing available in the colony, but over its immediate 
borders as well the land had been appropriated. In 1847 Governor Smith 
annexed thirty million acres adjoining the north and east of the 
colony, partly because he hoped to raise revenue by selling it. But he 
shortly reported that nearly all had been occupied by the Boers for 
some time and the government could find very little to dispose of. 
It is not difficult to fathom one reason for Chasets 
deception. A section of the British settlers, with which he sympathized, 
feared the day when the imperial government would surrender control of 
the colonyfs internal affairs to the colonists. The Boers outnumbered 
the British settlers and would then gain the upper hand, to the 
detriment of all interests but their own. In the years after 1840 this 
danger was clear but did not appear imminent. To anticipate it, men 
like Chase, Robert Godlonton and Richard Southey put their trust in the 
economic development of the country, which would attract British 
immigrants and concentrate all the wealth in their hands. Political 
power would then follow. By 1850 this policy was sufficiently defined 
for Southey to state it openly. "Were it not for the superior energy 
of the English, we should long since have been swampedn, he wrote. "We 
should therefore encourage by every possible means the increase of the 
English population - vote as much as possible to bring out English 
labour, and in every way encourage capitalists to come." (21) 
Albany, like the rest of the Cape, had little established 
industry - only a few tmeries and a soap factory. Agriculture 
offered the best hope for fulfilling Southeyls plan: ?I.. open up the 
resources of the country", he proposed, "let the attention of all 
Agricultural Societies and private individuals be directed to 
improvement in Agriculture and Stock - to the production of exportable 
articles, wool, cotton, etc, etc." The absorption of the Hottentot and 
Xhosa lands was a key feature of the scheme. Thus Southey and 
Godlonton corresponded as early as 1848 about taking over the Kat 
River Settlement (22), and in 1850 Godlonton presented Smith with a 
suggestion for turning Kaffraria into cotton farms. (21) An 
additional advantage was the lack of competition offered by the Boers. 
In 1848 an Englishman described Graaf Reinet in terms bordering on 
contempt : 
A vexatious quiet ... pervzdes everything 
and everyone; and none of that bustling 
energy of our countrymen, which is looked 
upon by these slow-thinking gentlemen as 
something quite ridiculous, is discernible 
in the trading operations of the 
imperturbable Dutchman. (24) 
To other observers it appeared inevitable that the Boers would be 
eclipsed by the expected rush of British immigrants. "Albany must be 
considered as occupied, speaking generallyf1, declared a visitor in 
1844, "and the Dutch districts are in a state of gradual revolution, 
which will consummate in the.occupation of all the most fertile parts 
by Ehglish settlers . . .l1 (25) 
British capitalists did not buy Boer land only to farm sheep, 
but also for purposes of speculation. In the areas of densest British 
settlement many farms were unoccupied or held on leases from private 
owners. "A spirit of speculation (for it would appear that wherever 
they go, the English will speculate) gives rise to frequent changes of 
property ...", recorded Gilchrist, "and sales of land are often made 
more upon speculative principles than with a view to farming ..I1 The 
result was that, as British purchasers penetrated Boer districts, the 
Boers began to value their land more highly. Godlonton observed this 
phenomenon, and thought it "worthy of remark" that just as the British 
settlers had "spread themselves out" so had land risen in value. Thus 
in the eastern Cape the scarcity of land was to some extent artificially 
created. At each successive advancement of the frontier a number of 
wealthy men bought farms for speculative reasons, and so excluded poorer 
applicants for land. The career of a man named Stanton provided a good 
example of this process. By 1854 he had three farms, each on a former 
boundary of the colony: "the one was at Kluklu, only divided by the 
Kat River from Kafirland; ... the other was about seven miles back, 
called Reading; the other farm was on the Fish River, called Schelm 
Kloof, about forty miles from the boundary." (26) 
Without more detailed analysis, purely speculative transactions 
cannot be separated from those made with a view to farming. In the Cape 
as a whole a rough idea of private dealing in property may be obtained 
by studying the transfer dues paid to the colonial treasury. These were 
collected under the authority of a colonial government proclamation 
dated 2 January 1818. They were fixed at 20% on the transfer of loan 
places and 4% on the sale of t'ransfer of houses or landed property, 
whether freehold or quit-rent. 
Transfer Dues - Cape Colony 
Supposing each figure to represent not less than 2% nor more than 4% 
of the total paid in private transfers, it can be calculated that in 
1847 between 8575,000 and 81.5m changed hands on property deals. By 
1854 the figure rose to between £l.lm and 82.2m. It is impossible to 
say precisely how much of this related to land in the eastern Cape and 
how much was speculative. But in view of the accusations made by 
Sir Andries Stockenstrom and C L Stretch (27), the statements of 
Godlonton and Gilchrist, and the allegation in 1851 that "a great many 
people in Cape Town" had an interest in estates in the eastern province, 
it may be assumed that speculators found an important field for their 
operations in the area. 
These details, imperfect as they are, indicate the nature of 
the economic climate in the eastern Cape during the forties. The boom 
in wool produced a demand for land, labour and capital. Local 
businessmen, eager to share in the new prosperity and sustain the boom, 
clamoured for the government to take measures for forcing labour onto 
the market because they themselves were not prepared to pay wages high 
enough to attract it. It was against this background that the 
government appointed officials to the Kat River Settlement chosen 
from among the wool farmers and businessmen of the area. In itself this 
was hardly enough to turn the Kat River people into rebels, however 
arbitrary the treatment they received may occasionally have seemed. 
Much is still obscure about this rebellion, but first examination 
suggests that clarification must be sought in the general economic and 
political atmosphere of the Cape rather than the activities of a few 
officials in the three years leading up to its outbreak. 
------ooo------ 
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